Numerous studies have demonstrated that exposure to live poultry or live poultry markets is the significant risk factor for human infection with avian influenza A(H7N9). However, the specific live poultry markets that are major infection sources for A(H7N9) human cases have not been explored in detail. In this study, we extract data associated with poultry farms, live poultry markets and farmers' markets from Baidu Map using the JavaScript language and then construct the live poultry transport network. From this, we establish our A(H7N9) transmission model over the network based upon probabilistic discrete-time Markov chain. On the basis of the obtained network and model, we propose spatiotemporal backward detection and forward transmission algorithms to detect the most likely infection sources and to compute the first arrival times of the infection sources. Our simulations use these algorithms to identify the specific locations of the infection sources, the first arrival times of the infection sources and the most likely transmission map of the A(H7N9) virus along the live poultry transport network. The results reveal that, in addition to the hazards posed by the live poultry markets, backyard poultry also contributed to A(H7N9) human infections; this risk source was significant especially in the newly affected provinces, in the fifth wave of infection. In particular, by analyzing the temperature characteristics at a given location when the infection source arrived, we find that the risk of human infection with the influenza A(H7N9) virus was high under 9 • C∼19 • C; moderate under 0 • C∼9 • C or 19 • C∼25 • C; and low for temperatures < 0 • C or > 25 • C. Our results suggest that strengthening the supervision of the live poultry market system and immunizing poultry at both live poultry markets and the backyard poultry operations under the high risk temperature band of 9 • C∼19 • C, will be able to significantly contribute to the control of avian influenza A(H7N9) in the future.
I. INTRODUCTION
The novel avian influenza A(H7N9) virus emerged in 2013. It is a bird flu strain of the influenza virus A (avian influenza virus or bird flu virus) [1] . The avian influenza A(H7N9) virus is only transmitted between poultry or from poultry to human. Human can be infected through direct exposure to poultry, poultry secretions or excreta, inhalation of The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Usama Mir . viral aerosols, and exposure to environments contaminated with the virus [2] - [4] . Human cases of A(H7N9) infection have occurred since 2013, during the annual winter-spring epidemics in mainland China [5] , [6] . After peaking in 2013-2014, the human infection cohort in subsequent epidemics was generally smaller [7] , but it sharply increased in the fifth epidemic wave in December 2016 [8] . This fifth epidemic wave (lasting from October 1st, 2016, to September 31st, 2017) was the most significant up until that point; 746 human cases were reported across 27 provinces VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ in mainland China. The A(H7N9) virus strains circulating among poultry had been classified as low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) in the previous four epidemic waves in China [9] , but evolved to be highly pathogenic in poultry in the fifth epidemic wave [10] . The earlier start date, larger epidemic size, wider epidemic range and higher pathogenicity in the fifth epidemic wave A(H7N9) prompted panic and aroused public concern. Most of the confirmed A(H7N9) cases in human had an etiology involving a history of recent exposure to live poultry or potentially contaminated environments, especially the live poultry markets, where live poultry is sold [11] , [12] . Wang et al. [13] demonstrated that contaminated of poultryrelated environments, including live poultry markets and backyard poultry, are the two major sources for exposure to diseased poultry; they divided human cases into rural, urban and semiurban cases and discovered that in each type of human case, all had visited a live poultry market and/or backyard poultry, in differing proportions for each type of human cases. The closure of live poultry markets was highly effective in reducing the risk of human infection with A(H7N9) by reducing human exposure to poultry [14] . Furthermore, other studies also confirmed the significant role of the live poultry trade on the occurrence of human infection with A(H7N9) [15] , [16] . However, the specific live poultry markets were the main infection sources of A(H7N9) cases in human and the characteristics of these sources have not yet been explored in detail.
Detecting the source of an infection for disease transmission depends on two key determinants: the network structure and the transmission model. A number of existing algorithms and mathematical theories can locate the source of diffusion in complex networks. For instance, Shah et al. [17] - [19] first presented a systematic study to find the virus source based upon rumor centrality by using maximum likelihood (ML) estimation in regular trees, general trees, and general graphs. The rumor centrality of a node is the number of permitted permutations of nodes that begin with that node and result in a virus graph. The rumor centrality measure is performed by selecting any node as the source node and calculating its rumor centrality for all nodes in the virus graph, referring to the node that maximizes the rumor center of the graph. Later, Luo et al. [20] , [21] expanded this method to identify multiple infection sources in networks. In addition, the Bayesian inference algorithm based on dynamic message-passing equations via belief propagation (BP) was developed by Altarelli et al. [22] and Loco at al. [23] . The dynamical message passing (DMP) approach and discrete-time Markov chain approach have been widely used to study the spreading dynamics on networks [24] , [25] . Furthermore, Antulov-Fantulin et al. [26] proposed using Monte-Carlo methods with soft-margin algorithms to detect the sources of epidemics, using snapshots of spreading patterns in static and temporal networks. The use of the NetSleuth algorithm, employing the minimum description length (MDL) principle, showed high accuracy in the detection of seed nodes and the correct automatic identification of their numbers [27] , [28] . Moreover, Shen et al. [29] developed a time-reversal backward-spreading algorithm to locate sources of infection, and tested this algorithm by employing epidemic spreading and consensus dynamics as typically dynamic processes and by applying it to the H1N1 pandemic in China. Thus, the detection of infection sources in networks is advancing in the field of infectious diseases.
In this paper, we extract data associated with poultry farms, live poultry markets and farmers' markets from Baidu Map by using the JavaScript language. We construct a live poultry transport network on the basis of the data obtained. Following this, we establish an A(H7N9) transmission model, based on probabilistic discrete-time Markov chain to describe the state transition for each of the type nodes in the network. According to the network constructed and model established, we propose spatiotemporal backward detection and forward transmission algorithms to detect the infection source of the epidemic. The simulation results from the algorithms are shown, which include the detected infection sources, first arrival time and maximum likelihood L(t, u) of infection sources, most likely spread map, and temperature characteristics in a given location at the arrival time of the A(H7N9) virus. In the final section of the paper, we present our major conclusions.
II. DATA AND NETWORK CONSTRUCTION
Live poultry and their surrounding environments are significant risk factors for human infection with A(H7N9). According to the present situation in China, the susceptible sites associated with live poultry are classified into poultry farms, backyard poultry, live poultry markets and farmers' markets [30] - [32] . Poultry farms are engaged in hatching and growing poultry to produce meat and eggs, and are usually characterized by their large-scale and industrialization. When they have reached a sufficient size, live poultry from poultry farms are transported to live poultry markets for wholesale. Backyard poultry refers to the poultry raised in the backyards of farmers in rural areas, which are usually characterized by low levels of technology and the scarcity of biosecurity practices. After feeding is finished, backyard poultry are transported to the nearby live poultry markets or farmers' markets for sale. Live poultry markets are the secondary wholesale markets for live poultry, where the live poultry from poultry farms and backyard poultry are wholesaled to the farmers' markets. Farmers' markets are the fixed places, mainly used for retailing. In addition to retailing live poultry, farmers' markets also sell vegetables, fruits, aquatic products, and other agricultural products and foods. Farmers' markets are generally located in the community, to facilitate residents' purchases of agricultural products. Operators of these markets buy live poultry from live poultry markets that are an approximately one hour round-trip drive away, usually before the opening of the farmers' market each morning. It is worth noting that there is no trading relationship between the same types of sites, because they are independent and competitive.
In the present study, the human infected with A(H7N9) virus are divided into three types [13] : urban residents, rural non-farmers and rural farmers. Urban residents and rural non-farmers may be infected by visiting a farmers' market or live poultry market, because they usually purchase live poultry or other agricultural products from nearby farmers' markets; the minority of people in this group go to nearby live poultry markets to purchase live poultry. Rural farmers may be infected through exposure to backyard poultry [33] , [34] .
The diagram presented in Fig 1 describes the transmission diagram of the A(H7N9) virus along the live poultry transport route. In the following sections, we collect data, construct network and establish transmission model according to this mode of live poultry transport and virus transmission.
A. DATA COLLECTION 1) DATA FOR A(H7N9) HUMAN CASES
The data on weekly reported human cases of avian influenza A(H7N9) used in the present study are obtained from the Center for Health Protection (http://www.chp.gov.hk) and cover the dates of October 1st, 2016 to May 17th, 2017. Individual case information includes geographic location, occupation, date of disease onset, date of reporting and the clinical condition of the environment at the time of disease reporting. Confirmed cases are all as defined by the World Health Organization criteria and the national authorities.
2) DATA FOR LIVE POULTRY TRANSPORT
Baidu Map (map.baidu.com) is the most popular online map service in China. It is similar to Google Map, comprises satellite images, street maps, street view and indoor view perspectives, and functions as a route planner for travel by foot, car, or public transportation. We extract the data associated with poultry farms, live poultry markets and farmers' markets from each city in the Baidu Map database using JavaScript language. The search terms include ''city name'' and ''poultry farm, chicken farm, and duckery''; ''city name'' and ''live poultry or poultry trade, wholesale''; and ''city name'' and ''farmers' market, agricultural market, vegetable market''. The extracted data contain information about the names and locations of all sites. As a key additional data set, we obtain the opening and closing times of the live poultry markets in each province or city from government documents.
B. DATA CLEANING AND PRE-PROCESSING 1) DATA CLEANING
To ensure the accuracy of the data associated with live poultry, it is necessary to manually perform data cleaning to discard some extraneous data. For example, when we extract poultry farm information in a city using the search terms ''city name'' and ''poultry farm, chicken farm, and duckery'', livestock farms also appear in the search results, although they are not relevant to live poultry. We thus need to exclude data that are not relevant to live poultry from the obtained data set, such as livestock farms.
2) DATA PREPROCESSING Using Eq.(1), we compute the distances AB between the following four types of sites based on their longitudes and latitudes:
• each A(H7N9) human case and each farmers' market; • each A(H7N9) human case and each live poultry market; • each farmers' market and each live poultry market; 
C. NETWORK CONSTRUCTION
Using the cleaned and preprocessed data, we construct the live poultry transport network as a directed and weighted graph G = (V , E), where V denotes a set of nodes and E is the set of edges in the network. The weight of each edge is defined as the actual distance between the two linked nodes. The detailed network construction is described as follows:
Nodes. Nodes can be divided into four types: A(H7N9) infected human, farmers' markets, live poultry markets (LPM) and poultry farms. The infected human nodes include three subtypes: urban residents, rural non-farmers and rural farmers. Backyard poultry (BP) are considered the ''sun node'' in every city, and are assumed to be only transported to live poultry markets, farmers' markets, or to contact with rural farmers, according to the present situation in China.
Edges. Four directed edges are established, according to the distance between the different types of nodes as follows:
• Within 3 kilometers from farmers' markets to infected urban residents or rural non-farmers; Reason for the distance determination: The Chinese population usually commutes 1 to 3 kilometers in their communities every day [35] .
• Within 3 kilometers from live poultry market to infected urban residents or rural non-farmers; Reason for the distance determination: The Chinese population usually commutes 1 to 3 kilometers in their communities every day [35] .
• Within 20 kilometers from live poultry markets to farmers' markets; Reason for the distance determination: a) Investigations indicate that most respondents transport live poultry from live poultry markets to farmers' markets over distances of approximately 10 kilometers [36] . b) According to the present situation in China, farmers' market operators usually travel to purchase live poultry from live poultry markets that are an approximately one hour round-trip drive away (10-20 kilometers), prior to the opening of the farmers' markets each morning. Thus, we determine 20 kilometers to be the maximum distance from live poultry markets to farmers' markets.
• Within 100 kilometers from poultry farms to live poultry markets.
Reason for the distance determination: a) In China, poultry farms are most often located in the suburbs or rural areas far from the live poultry markets. Investigation indicates that live poultry can be transported for sale much longer distances (in excess of 100 kilometers) [36] . b) We determine 100 kilometers as the maximum distance, by comparing the average degree and degree distributions, in the network within the different distances from poultry farms to live poultry markets in APPENDIX A. Furthermore, the spatial transmission probability is proportional to the actual distance from the infectious node to the susceptible node, as shown in Eq.(2) in the next section. In summary, our creation of directed edges according to the distance between different types of nodes and the choice of distances is, thus scientific and reasonable.
Time-varying. Our network is temporally dynamic. Nodes and edges are deleted or added according to the closing and reopening of live poultry markets over time.
III. TRANSMISSION MODEL
The transmission dynamics are considered for the A(H7N9) virus as a multi-group model. Fig 2 shows the state transition graph for the four types of nodes in this model. The main variables and parameters used are described in Table 1 and  Table 2 . In our model, the nodes representing poultry farms, backyard poultry, live poultry markets and farmers' markets, are classified as susceptible or infected. As such, S p (S b ) and I p (I b ) represent susceptible and infected poultry farms (backyard poultry), respectively. S l (S f ) and I l (I f ) describe susceptible and infected live poultry markets (farmers' markets), respectively. Contagion transfer was considered to occur only between different types of nodes, through the transport of live poultry. Human nodes were classified into three states as susceptible, infected or recovered. The avian influenza virus is only transmitted to human from backyard poultry, live poultry markets and farmers' markets; it cannot spread among human. S r , I r and R r represent susceptible, infected and recovered rural farmers, respectively. S u , I u and R u describe susceptible, infected and recovered rural non-farmers or urban residents, respectively.
The detailed state transition is described as follows:
1) The susceptible poultry farm (S p ) can be infected with probability β p , and then become an infected poultry farm (I p ); 2) The susceptible backyard poultry (S b ) can be infected with probability β b , and then become an infected backyard poultry (I b ); 3) The susceptible live poultry market (S l ) can be infected by infected poultry farm neighbors (I p ) or backyard poultry (I b ) with probability λ pl (j, t) + β bl , and then become an infected live poultry market (I l ); 4) The susceptible farmers' market (S f ) can be infected by infected live poultry market neighbors (I l ) or backyard poultry (I b ) with probability λ lf (k, t) + β bf , and then become an infected farmers' market (I f );
5) The susceptible rural farmer (S r ) can be infected by infected backyard poultry (I b ) with probability β br , and then recover with probability γ ; 6) The susceptible rural non-farmer or urban resident (S u ) can be infected by infected farmers' market neighbors (I f ) or live poultry market neighbors (I l ) with probability λ fu (m, t) + λ lu (m, t), and then recover with probability γ . To describe states more precisely in different types of nodes at time t, we introduce two sub-states for infected nodes (I ): ''contagious'' (C) and ''maintained contagious'' (M ) in Fig 2. Once an S node is infected, it first becomes C and then transits to M . The C state describes nodes that are newly infected. More specifically, a node that is C at time t means that this node is susceptible at time t − 1 but becomes infected at time t. The M state describes nodes that are infected but not newly infected. More explicitly, once an S node is infected, it first becomes C at time t and then transits to M at time t + 1. The M node will stay infected until it recovers or is removed from the network [37] .
According to the transmission dynamics of the A(H7N9) virus described above, we establish a transmission model based on a Markov chain to calculate the probabilities of each node in the various states. For simplicity, the state transition of a live poultry market is described here as an example, which can then be applied to other types of nodes. A susceptible live poultry market can be infected by infected poultry farm neighbors or backyard poultry in the city, it then becomes an infected live poultry market. β bl is defined as the infection rate of infected backyard poultry nodes to a susceptible live poultry market node, and η ij (t) is the spreading probability from a poultry farm node i to live poultry market node j at time t. η ij (t) is a function of the actual distance of the link ω ij as follows:
Then, we can use Eq.(2) to calculate the probability λ pl (j, t) of a susceptible live poultry market j being infected by its infected poultry farm neighbors at time t. Because the probability that node j is not infected means that none of its infected poultry farm neighbors spread the virus to it through their links, we can calculate the probability as follows:
where, the product runs over all poultry farm neighbors of live poultry market node j. After this, we can then calculate the probability of an arbitrary live poultry market node j being susceptible at time t as follows:
A susceptible live poultry market node first becomes contagious once it has been infected. We can calculate the probability that an arbitrary live poultry market node j is contagious at time t as follows:
The infected state of a live poultry market node means that it is in either C or M state. In other words, the infected node is either a new infection at time t or the infected one before time t. Thus, the probability of an arbitrary live poultry market node j being infected at time t, is represented by:
All other terms in the model can be deduced in a similar manner, and the full model equations are given by the following.
where the other terms λ lf (k, t), λ fu (m, t), and λ lu (m, t) are deduced in a manner similar to the above: 
IV. ALGORITHM
Based on the network constructed and on the model established, we present spatiotemporal backward detection and forward transmission algorithms to detect the most likely infection sources, and compute the first arrival time and maximum likelihood L(t, u) of the infection sources. The rationale of the algorithms is the spread of the A(H7N9) virus along the reversed dynamic connections from each infected person node to exhaust all possible paths for spreading the virus, and then compute the probability of each detected node is an infection source using the Eq. (7) . A simple example is provided next to describe the spatiotemporal backward detection and forward transmission algorithms presented in Fig 3. For the infected person node o 1 at infection time t 1 , we first reverse detect to derive the farmers' market nodes f 1 , f 2 , and f 3 and the live poultry market node l 2 at time t 1 − 1, and then obtain the live poultry market nodes l 1 , l 2 and the poultry farm node p 2 at time t 1 − 2. Finally, we acquire the poultry farm nodes p 1 , p 2 at time t 1 − 3 in Fig 3(A) . This allow the identification of the most likely live poultry market or poultry farm infection source of o 1 by computing the maximum likelihood value of the detected nodes l 1 , l 2 or p 1 , p 2 , respectively. In addition, poultry farm node p 1 can spatiotemporal forward transmit the virus to both infected human nodes o 1 and o 2 , which is true for the live poultry market l 2 in Fig 3(B) . We can compute the first arrival time and maximum likelihood value of the detected infection sources p 1 and l 2 using a spatiotemporal forward transmission algorithm.
A. SPATIOTEMPORAL BACKWARD DETECTION
The spatiotemporal backward detection algorithm is inspired by the time-reversal backward spreading and reverse dissemination algorithm [29] , [37] , [38] . However, the spatiotemporal backward detection algorithm proposed here is more advanced than these two algorithms. Because our network dynamically changes over time, the probability that each node connects to its neighbor node varies with the spatial distance, and the number of infection sources is greater than one. A detailed description of the algorithm is shown in Table 3 .
The live poultry transport network constructed here records not only the spatial location of the nodes and edges, but also the time at which each infected person becomes contagious. The real infection source is expected to transmit the virus both spatially and temporally, therefore presenting a better match to the infected person node compared to the other nodes in the set of infection sources U . The core of the algorithm proposed here is the virus transmission model, as explained in the previous section, which provides an estimate of the probability that an arbitrary node is contagious (C) at time t. For an arbitrary infected person node o m , we use P C (u, t s |o m ) to denote the probability that an arbitrary node u is contagious (C) after time t s , starting with backward detection from the infected person node o m , where t s is the time span of the whole backward detection process. With the use of Bayes' rule, the probability that node u transmits the virus to o m is proportional to the joint probability of node o m reverse transmitting the virus to u at time t m , P(o m |u) ∼ P(u|o m ).
Mathematically, the node with the maximum likelihood, L(u, t), of being the most likely infection source is defined as follows:
For computation convenience, we adopt a logarithmic function ln(·) in (10) to derive the maximum likelihood. Among all the nodes in U m , we can estimate the most likely sources of node o m infection by selecting the maximum value of L(u, t) as follows: 
B. SPATIOTEMPORAL FORWARD TRANSMISSION
Because a single infection source may infect more than one of its neighbors, it might be the source of multiple infected human nodes. For instance, the poultry farm node p 1 can forward transmit the virus to both infected human nodes o 1 and o 2 , as can the live poultry market l 2 in Fig 3(B) . The spatiotemporal forward transmission algorithm is developed to compute the probability of node u being the infection source and the first arrival time of the virus. The detailed algorithm description is shown in Table 4 . L(t, u) is used to denote the maximum likelihood of the virus spreading to infected human nodes at the infection source node u at time t, and P C (o m , t s |u) to calculate probability of an arbitrary infected person node o m being contagious (C) after time t s , starting spatiotemporal forward transmission from source node u, where t s is the time span of the entire forward transmission process. For computing purposes, we adopt the logarithmic function ln(·) in (12) to derive the maximum likelihood.
Furthermore, we also have an estimation of the infection scale I (t, u) as a byproduct, as in (13) . Later, we can justify the effectiveness of the algorithm and maximum likelihood FIGURE 6. Partial rank correlation coefficients (PRCCs) for parameters β lf , β fu , β lu , β bl , β bf , β br with respect to the maximum likelihood L(u, t ). (a) The PRCCs for parameters β lf , β fu , β lu , β bl , β bf , β br with respect to the maximum likelihood L(u, t ) associated with all the detected suspected live poultry market infection sources (l 2 , l 1 , l 3 , l 4 , l 8 , l 5 , l 9 , l 6 , l 7 ) of human case o 1 . (b) The PRCCs for parameters β lf , β fu , β lu , β bl , β bf , β br with respect to the maximum likelihood L(u, t ) associated with all the detected suspect live poultry market infection sources (l 10 , l 13 , l 1 , l 12 ) of human case o 2 . method by examining the accuracy of I (t, u) as follows:
V. RESULTS
In this section, we provide the simulation results from the above algorithms based on the constructed live poultry transport network and the established A(H7N9) transmission model. The results include detected infection sources, first arrival time and L(t, u) of the infection sources, and the most likely spread map of the A(H7N9) virus and the temperature characteristics of the arrival time. as examples. The parameters β lf , β fu , β lu , β bl , β bf , and β br in the transmission model Eq. (7), are sampled 1000 times within their respective ranges using a Latin hypercube sampling (LHS) method to optimize the sampling of parameter space. The results are presented as box plots depicting the median, lower and upper quartiles of L(u, t) from the 1000 simulations. For infected person node o 1 , 9 live poultry market nodes are detected. Live poultry market node l 2 is the most likely infection source of o 1 , because its L(u, t) is far greater than that of the other 8 nodes in Fig 5(a) . Similarly, the live poultry market node l 10 is the most likely infection source of infected person node o 2 in Fig 5(b) . When the likelihood values L(u, t) of the first two nodes had approximately the same rank, they are both considered as the most likely infection sources.
Uncertainty and sensitivity analyses. The estimations of β lf , β fu , β lu , β bl , β bf , and β br are uncertain, so we use the Latin hypercube sampling method to sample these 6 parameters, which appear in the transmission model Eq. (7) and the derived expression L(u, t). Latin hypercube sampling (LHS) is an extension of the Latin square sampling method. Uncertainty and sensitivity analyses based on LHS and partial rank correlation coefficients (PRCCs) have been applied to disease transmission models in previous studies [39] - [42] . In our work, we perform uncertainty and sensitivity analyses for the parameters β lf , β fu , β lu , β bl , β bf , and β br in the model Eq. (7) using LHS with 1000 samples. The parameter values and their corresponding 95% confidence intervals are listed in Table 2 , and a normal distribution function is used for all parameters [43] - [45] . As an example, the partial rank correlation coefficients (PRCCs) for the parameters with respect to the maximum likelihood L(u, t) associated with all detected suspected live poultry market infection sources for human cases o 1 and o 2 are shown in Fig 6. The results indicate that the PRCCs associated with the parameters β bl and β bf are the most influential in determining the magnitude of the aggregate L(u, t), (|PRCC| > 0.5), and are statistically significant (p < 0.05).
Using this approach, we analyze the infection sources of all infected human nodes in Suzhou City and found that approximately 68.5% of the infected human cases could be detected as having their infection source in the live poultry markets, and the infection source of the remaining 31.5% of infected human cases as a result of backyard poultry, as shown in Fig 7. Furthermore, we identify the infection source of all human cases in every province of mainland China. The proportion of infections originating in the live poultry market is also higher than that originating from backyard poultry in the provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Guangdong, as shown in Fig 7(a) . The chi-square test is used to compare the proportion of infected human cases whose the most likely infection source is live poultry market or backyard poultry among different areas. There is no significant difference among the Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Guangdong Province (χ 2 = 4.229, p = 0.376), as shown in TABLE 6 (APPENDIX C). However, the source of more than 80% of infected human cases stems from backyard poultry in several provinces, including Guangxi, Guizhou, Sichuan, Henan and Hebei Provinces, and this proportion is 90% or higher in Guizhou and Hebei in Fig 7(b) . Overall, the source of approximately 65.1% of human A(H7N9) infections in mainland China is the live poultry market while the remaining 34.9% resulted from backyard poultry. There is no significant difference among Guangxi, Guizhou, Sichuan, Henan and Hebei Provinces (χ 2 = 5.282, p = 0.261), as shown in TABLE 7 (APPENDIX C). The other live poultry transport networks in China, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Guangxi, Guizhou, Sichuan, Henan, and Hebei, are given in APPENDIX B.
As a result of the above discovery regarding infection sources, we compare the A(H7N9) human cases across the five epidemics. Fig 8(a) shows that the residences of infected human in mainland China gradually shifted from urban (urban residents) to rural areas (rural farmers and rural non-farmers) from the first to the fifth epidemics with a significant difference (χ 2 = 21.207, p < 0.01), although the precise situation varied by province, as shown in TABLE 8 (APPENDIX C). This shift also explains the changes in the proportion of the sources is backyard poultry in Fig 8(a) . In addition, for the newly infected provinces in the fifth wave epidemic, i.e. those that with no or fewer human cases in the previous four epidemics, such as Sichuan (the number of infected human in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th wave epidemic is 0, 0, 0, 0, 30, respectively), Guangxi (0, 2, 0, 0, 25,respectively), Guizhou (0, 0, 1, 0, 15,respectively), Henan (4, 0, 0, 1, 22, respectively), and Hebei (1, 0, 0, 6, 20,respectively), the proportion of rural infected human cases is relatively high in the 5th wave epidemic, as shown in Fig 8(b) . This reveals that backyard poultry is also an important risk factor for the spread of A(H7N9) virus, especially in the fifth wave, as shown in combination with Fig 8(b) . Furthermore, we show the geographic distribution of the proportion of human cases in which the detected infection source was live poultry markets and backyard poultry, in the 5th avian influenza A(H7N9) wave in mainland China, as shown in Fig 9. The difference in the proportion of human cases whose detected infection source is the live poultry market or backyard poultry across provinces was significant (χ 2 = 121.206, p < 0.01), as shown in TABLE 9 (APPENDIX C).
From the above, we can see that, in addition to live poultry markets, backyard poultry is an important infection source of human A(H7N9) infections, and the risk presented by backyard poultry was high, especially in the fifth wave epidemic in newly infected provinces. This may be due to the accumulation of live poultry in rural areas after the closing of the live poultry markets in some cities or provinces. Therefore, live poultry market closure was effective for controlling the human risk of infection with avian influenza A(H7N9) virus, but cleaning and transforming live poultry markets, changing the trading mode, and immunizing live poultry would have more substantial effects than just closing live poultry markets.
B. FIRST ARRIVAL TIME AND THE MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD VALUE OF INFECTION SOURCES
It is known that a single infection source may infect multiple infected persons. For example, the live poultry market node l 2 is detected as the infection source of person node o 1 at time t 1 − 2, as shown in Fig 3, but also transmit virus to infected person node o 2 at time t 2 −2. There are many similar examples, and thus, we compute the first arrival time of each detected infection source.
Node . Fig 10(a) shows the first arrival time and maximum likelihood L(t, u) of the detected live poultry market infection sources in Suzhou City, where the total number of live poultry markets is 22, 10 of these markets are detected as the most likely infection sources. Whereas the deviation between the estimated cases and all newly reported cases is relatively large, the deviation between the estimated cases and the sum of reported rural non-farmer and urban cases is small, as shown in Fig 10(b) . This is because the virus can only be transmitted to urban residents and rural non-farmers from the live poultry market infection source using the forward transmission algorithm. However, backyard poultry are the infection sources of rural farmers and some non-farmers. The small deviation between the estimated cases and the sum of reported rural non-farmer and urban cases demonstrates that our algorithm is valid. The large deviation between the estimated cases and all newly reported cases reveals the high risk of backyard poultry spreading the A(H7N9) virus.
City. Our network displayed connections between adjacent cities in the same province, especially in the urban fringes. Therefore, we expand from a single city to the whole province, to analyze the characteristics of A(H7N9) transmission among cities. Fig 11 shows our constructed live poultry transport network for Jiangsu Province . Fig 12(a) shows the first arrival time and maximum likelihood L(t, u) of the detected live poultry market infection sources in the whole of Jiangsu Province, where there are 75 live poultry markets, 30 of which are detected as the most likely infection sources.
In addition, four of these markets were reported as A(H7N9) positive markets [46] . We must take into account that not every live poultry market was tested for A(H7N9) virus on any given day, and therefore we are using limited data to illustrate the live poultry markets in which the virus was detected. Cities are sorted according to the first arrival time of the infection source, as shown in Fig 12(b) , which shows that the A(H7N9) virus spread from southeast to northwest China through the live poultry trade. In Changzhou, Zhenjiang, and Huaian City, the infection sources for the first human cases were the live poultry market (LPM) in their adjacent cities, and the first arrival time of the infection source was later than human cases in their own cities. In Taizhou, Yancheng, Nanjing, Yangzhou City, the virus was first found in backyard poultry (BP).
Province. Furthermore, we expand the research object from a single province to all of mainland China to analyze the characteristics of A(H7N9) transmission among infected provinces through the live poultry transport network. In Fig 13, the first arrival time of infection sources to each province are displayed. The infection sources of the first human cases were the live poultry markets (LPM) in the neighboring provinces of some provinces. The A(H7N9) virus was first detected in backyard poultry (BP) in Guizhou, Henan, Sichuan, Gansu, Jilin, Shaanxi Province and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.
C. THE MOST LIKELY TRANSMISSION MAP
Human A(H7N9) influenza cases first occurred in Jiangsu, Guangdong, Fujian and Zhejiang Provinces, at the beginning of the 5th wave epidemic, as shown in Fig 14(a) . By May 17th, 2017, the epidemic had spread across 25 provinces in mainland China, as shown in Fig 14(b) . Fig 14(c) shows the live poultry transport network constructed for infected cities in mainland China. Based on this network, we infer the most likely spread map of A(H7N9) virus using Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, as shown in Fig 14(d) . The A(H7N9) virus spread westward along four paths (i.e. the red, pink, green and blue paths) from the Yangtze and Pearl River Deltas, Zhejiang and Jiangsu Provinces and from there, spread to more provinces. In the 7 provinces marked with a yellow star (i.e. Guizhou, Henan, Sichuan, Gansu, Jilin, and Shaanxi Provinces and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region), A(H7N9) virus was first found in the backyard poultry kept within the area.
D. TEMPERATURE CHARACTERISTICS
Previous studies have demonstrated that temperature contributed significantly to the occurrence of human infection with the influenza A(H7N9) virus [47] - [49] . In this subsection, we analyze the temperature characteristics on the first and peak arrival times of the infection sources detected in each city. Fig 15 shows the geographic distribution of weekly temperature on the first and peak arrival time of infection sources. The weekly temperatures (minimum, maximum and average temperature) during the study period were obtained from the Weather Underground (http://www.wunderground.com). Fig 16 shows the proportion of infected cities in which the weekly temperature is concentrated in different temperature ranges on the first and peak arrival times of infection sources. At the first arrival time of the infection sources, the minimum temperature in 52.3% of infected cities was concentrated in the range of 0 • C∼9 • C, the proportions of infected cities with minimum temperatures of < 0 • C, 9 • C∼19 • C, 19 • C∼25 • C and > 25 • C were 9.8%, 34.6%, 2.6%, and 0.7%, respectively, as shown in Fig 16 (a) . The maximum temperature in 61.4% of infected cities was concentrated in the range of 9 • C∼19 • C, the proportion of infected cities with maximum temperatures of < 0 • C, 0 • C∼9 • C, 19 • C∼25 • C and > 25 • C were 1.3%, 11.1%, 19.6%, and 6.6%, respectively, as shown in Fig 16 (b) . The average temperature in 56.9% of infected cities was concentrated in the range of 9 • C∼19 • C, the proportion of infected cities with average temperatures of < 0 • C, 0 • C∼9 • C, 19 • C∼25 • C and > 25 • C are 2.0%, 30.7%, 9.8%, and 0.6%, respectively, as shown in Fig 16 (c) . During the peak arrival time of infection sources, the temperature presented the same characteristics, although the proportions varied among temperature ranges. In summary, the risk of human infection with the influenza A(H7N9) virus was high when the temperature is 9 • C∼19 • C, moderate when the temperature was 0 • C∼9 • C or 19 • C∼25 • C, and low when the temperature was < 0 • C or > 25 • C.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this study first constructed a live poultry transport network using data extracted from Baidu Map using the JavaScript language. Then, an A(H7N9) transmission model of a network based on probabilistic discrete-time Markov chains was established. Significantly, we introduced spatiotemporal backward detection and forward transmission algorithms to detect the infection source, compute the first arrival time of A(H7N9) virus, and analyze their characteristics. By detecting the infection source of each human case, we discovered that, in addition to the live poultry markets, backyard poultry were also a very significant source of infection for A(H7N9) human cases. The risk from backyard poultry infection was high, which was most especially seen in the 5th wave of avian influence in newly infected provinces. Therefore, we believe that live poultry market closures were effective in controlling the risk to human from the avian influenza A(H7N9) virus infection. However, beyond simply closing the live poultry markets, there would be a more significant effect from cleaning and transforming the live poultry markets, changing the trading mode and immunizing live poultry. Meanwhile, we drew the most likely transmission map of the A(H7N9) virus along the live poultry transport network. The result shows that the A(H7N9) virus spread westward along the Yangtze River Delta and Pearl River Delta, and then the virus was spread to more provinces mainly from the Yangtze River Delta. Furthermore, we analyzed the temperature characteristics of A(H7N9) virus transmission according to the arrival time we obtained for detected infection sources in each city. When the temperature was 9 • C∼19 • C, the risk of human infection with the influenza A(H7N9) virus was high; 0 • C∼9 • C and 19 • C∼25 • C, represented moderate risk and the temperature range below 0 • C or above 25 • C, indicated low infection risk.
These results provide meaningful suggestions for the prevention and control of A(H7N9) avian influenza infection. However, some deficiencies exist in our study. For instance, we constructed edges to the networks according to the spherical distance between different nodes, ignoring the real live poultry transport paths along the actual roads, due to the difficulty of acquiring data. Moreover, we did not take into account the change in the infection rate with spatiotemporal changes in temperature, and humidity. Research into a more perfectly representative transmission model on a constructed real network is a difficult challenge, requiring more sophisticated data mining technology and a more comprehensive concept of the necessary mathematical modeling. Our work may shed some light on future studies into infectious diseases within real and complex networks.
APPENDIX A THE REASON B) FOR THE DISTANCE DETERMINATION FROM POULTRY FARM TO LIVE POULTRY MARKET
We determined the maximum distance between poultry farms and live poultry market by comparing the average degree and degree distributions, in the network within different distances (80km, 100km, 120km, 150km) from poultry farm to live poultry market. In the directed network G = (V , E) with N nodes, where V is the set of nodes and E is the set of edges. Each node (individual) v has a certain out-degree k out v and FIGURE 18. The constructed live poultry transport network of Zhejiang Province. in-degree k in v . k out v represents the number of edges connected from node v to other nodes, k in v represents the number of edges connected from other nodes to node i [50] . The average out-degree k out and average in-degree k in are denoted as
In our study, we are concerned about the average out-degree of poultry farm k out p and the average in-degree of live poultry market k in l . That is:
where V p is the set of poultry farm nodes, N p is the number of poultry farm nodes, V l is the set of live poultry market nodes, N l is the number of live poultry market nodes. According to Eq.(15), we calculated the average out-degree of the poultry farms and average in-degree of the live poultry market, in the network within different distances (80km, 100km, 120km, 150km) from poultry farm to live poultry market in Table 5 . We found that the number of average live poultry market neighbors of poultry farms k out p and the poultry farm neighbors of live poultry market k in l were too dense, when the distance between the poultry farm and live poultry market was more than 100 kilometers. This is more consistent with the present situation in China, where the distance between poultry farm and live poultry market is less than 100 kilometers.
In addition, we verified the reasonableness of distance selection by comparing the degree distribution of the network within different distances. p(k out p ) is the out-degree distribution of poultry farm nodes in the network, which represents the probability that out-degree is k of a arbitrarily poultry farm node [51] . That is:
where N p (k) is the number of poultry farm nodes whose out-degree is k.
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